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THn NmWBiRY CAsr-Senator Newberry of Michigan and sixteen others
were convicted in the United States District Court on the charge that they
"unlawfully and feloniously did conspire, combine, confederate, and agree
together to commit the offense [in the Newberry indictment] on his part
of wilfully violating the act of Congress approved June 25, igio, as amended,
by giving, contributing, expending, and using and by causing to be given,
contributed, expended and used in procuring his nomination and election at
said primary and general elections, a greater sum than the laws of Michigan
NOTE AND COMMENT
permitted and above ten thousand dollars," etc. The Act of Congress re-
ferred to (c. 392, 36 Stat. 822-824, amended c. 33, 37 Stat. 25-29) commonly
known as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, provides: "No candidate for
Representative in Congress or for Senator of the United States shall give,
contribute, expend, use, or promise, or cause to be given, contributed, ex-
pended, used, or promised, in procuring his nomination and election, any
sum, in the aggregate, in excess of the amount which he may lawfully give,
contribute, expend, or promise under the laws of the state in which he re-
sides," etc. This Act read in connection with the Michigan statute fixed the
maximum sum so allowed to be expended by a candidate for the United States
Senate at $3,75o. The trial court overruled a demurrer challenging the con-
stitutionality of the Act of Congress.
On the trial the court (Judge Sessions) charged the jury inter alia as
follows:
(c) "To apply these rules to this case: If you are satisfied from
the evidence that the defendant, Truman H. Newberry at or about
the time that he became a candidate for United States Senator was
informed and knew that his campaign for the nomination and election
would require the expenditure and use of more money than is per-
mitted by law and with such knowledge became a candidate, and
thereafter by advice, by conduct, by his acts, by his direction, by his
counsel, or by his procurement he actively participated and took part
in the expenditure and use of an excessive sum of money, of an un-
lawful sum of money, you will be warranted in finding 'that he did
violate this statute known as the Corrupt Practices Act."
In the Supreme Court the Justices were unanimously of the opinion that
the jfdgment should be reversed for error in the charge quoted, Chief Jus-
tice White referring to the charge of the trial court as a "grave misappre-
hension and grievous misapplication of the statute.' Five members of the
Court (McReynolds, Day, McKenna, VanDevanter, and Holmes) were of
the opinion that the Act of Congress was unconstitutional. The concurrence
of Mr. Justice McKenna, however, was with the reservation of a possible
contrary conclusion if the Seventeenth Amendment could be taken into ac-
count. Mr. Justice Pitney delivered an opinion in which Brandeis and Clark,
J. J., concurred upholding the power of Congress, while the Chief Justice in a
separate opinion arrived at the same conclusion. Trumawn H. Newberry et
al v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct., No. 559, May 2, 1921.
The fault found in the charge above quoted is succinctly stated by Mr.
Justice Pitney as follows:
"However this may be regarded when considered in the abstract, the
difficulty with it, when viewed in connection with the evidence in the
case to which the jury was called upon to apply it, is that it permitted
and perhaps encouraged the jury to find the defendants guilty of a
conspiracy to violate the Corrupt Practices Act if they merely con-
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templated a campaign requiring the expenditure of money beyond the
statutory limit even though Mr. Newberry, the candidate, had not,
and it was not contemplated that he should have, any part in causing
or procuring such expenditure beyond his mere standing voluntarily
as a candidate and participating in the campaign with knowledge that
moneys contributed and expended by others without his participation
were to be expended. * * *
"A reading of the entire Act makes it plain that Congress did not
intend to limit spontaneous contributions of money by others than a
candidate, nor expenditures of such money except as he should par-
ticipate therein. * * * Spontaneous expenditures by others being with-
out the scope of the prohibition, neither he nor anybody else can be
held criminally responsible for merely abetting such expenditures.
"It follows that one's entry upon a candidacy for nomination and
election as a Senator with knowledge that such candidacy will come
to naught unless supported by expenditure of money beyond the speci-
fied limit, is not within the inhibition of the Act unless it is contem-
plated that the candidate shall have a part in procuring the excessive
expenditures beyond the effect of his mere candidacy in evoking spon-
taneous contributions and expenditures by his supporters; and that his
remaining in the field and participating in the ordinary activities fur-
nish in a general sense the 'occasion' for the expenditure is not to
be regarded as a 'causing' by the candidate of such expenditure with-
in the meaning of the statute."
The Court's conclusion on the interpretation of the Corrupt Practices
Act and the propriety of the charge to the jury are of course interesting and
important, but by far the most vital part of the case is that dealing with the
power of Congress to legislate regarding primary elections of candidates for
the National Legislature. In many of the cases involving constitutional ques-
tions decided by a divided court the differences are due to varying views as
to economic and social policies and theories. As to these one may agree or
disagree, but it is pretty difficult to say with assurance that either position 
is
wrong. The Newberry case, however, turns on a question which is purely
one of construction of the Constitution, and it is believed that one is 
war-
ranted in saying, with all deference, that the majority conclusion is unsound.
By the Constitution it is provided: "All legislative Power herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives" (Art. I, Sec. i) ; "The Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places for
chusing Senators" (Art. I, Sec. 4) ; "The Congress shall have power * * *
to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Ex-
ecution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Offi-
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cer thereof" (Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. x8). Since Senators are officers of the 
United
States and the office exists solely by virtue of the Constitution 
we assume
that it would not be seriously questioned, if there 
were no other provisions
therein regarding the manner of their selection or 
limiting the legislative
power of the Federal Government in respect thereof, 
that Congress would
have plenary power over all matters relating to their choice. 
It has long been
settled that Congress may provide for the conduct 
of the election proper.
Ex parte Siebold, ioo U. S. 371; United States v. Gradwell, 
243 U. S. 476.
Regulation of primaries, admittedly of no other purpose 
than to determine
whose names shall go on the ballots in the general 
election, surely would be
no farther removed from the end to be accomplished 
than was the creation
of the bank upheld in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 
316. The classic
statement by Chief Justice Marshall in that case (p. 421) 
seems entirely ap-
plicable: "We think the sound construction of the 
Constitution must allow
to the national legislature that discretion, with respect 
to the means by which
the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, 
which will enable that
body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the 
manner most bene-
ficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let 
it be within the scope of
the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, 
which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited but consist 
with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."
Many cases might be referred to in which Congressional 
action has been
upheld where the immediate subject of the legislation was 
as far or farther
removed from the subject control over which was vested 
by the Constitu-
tion in federal hands, as regulation of primaries is removed 
from a Consti-
tutional provision by which is created the office to be filled. 
See Second Ein
ployers Liability Cases, 223 U. S. : (relations between 
common carriers and
their employes) ; Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 
(registration of
man power and imposition of compulsory military service); United 
States v.
Ferger, 25o U. S. igg (punishment of the fraudulent making 
of spurious
interstate bills of lading); Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 
254 (prohibition of
manufacture of non-intoxicating beer). And in In Re Neagle, 135 U. 
S. I,
the provision of section three Article two, that the President 
"shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed" was deemed 
sufficiently close to
the matter of protection of United States judges to support 
the assignment
of a deputy marshal to protect Mr. Justice Field from the 
Terrys.
Is there anything in the Constitution that denies or limits such 
power of
Congress? It may be argued that Sec. 4 of Art. I, above 
quoted, does so.
Surely there is nothing else that can be relied upon as 
even tending to up-
hold such a claim. It would seem perfectly apparent, however, 
that the sec-
tion referred to is a constitutional delegation of power 
to the states, and
even that has a string tied to it. Were it not for the 
fact that five of the
members of the Supreme Court are of the opinion that 
Art. I, Sec. 4, is a
grant of power to Congress, in fact the only basis for 
any claim by Con-
gress to control even elections of Senators and Representatives; 
one would
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feel almost warranted in saying that it was absurd to contend that the sec-
tion was anything other than as above stated. It is the States, not the Fed-
eral Government, that get their power from that section.
The inherent reasonableness of the view of the minority is apparent when
it is realized that in truth in a large percentage of the states it is the pri-
mary election, not the general election, that determines who the officers
shall be. The decision of the majority means that in those states Congress
is virtually helpless in the control of the selection of its own members. To
be sure seats may be denied, but at best that is an uncertain remedy, and
so far as punishment is concerned there can be none-at least so far as Con-
gress is concerned-except in such denial of a seat.
